The UN80 initiative was launched in March 2025 by the secretary-general with the objective of creating a more "agile, integrated, and equipped" organization able to respond to today's challenges amid tightening resources. Over the last several weeks, the secretary-general has released reports under each of the three workstreams: efficiency and effectiveness, mandate implementation, and structural changes to the UN system.
Released under the title "Shifting Paradigms: United to Deliver," the Workstream 3 report includes recommendations for reform across the UN's four pillars -- peace and security, humanitarian action, sustainable development, and human rights. While the secretary-general frames the report as offering "initial steps towards a genuine paradigm shift," the proposals fall short of the urgency of the moment. Far from the bold, visionary overhaul that many, including the secretary-general, have been calling for, the recommendations feel ad hoc, disjointed, and driven by the lowest common denominator. This is particularly true for the peace and security pillar, where the report misses the mark in several areas.
What Is in the Report?
The secretary-general opens the section on peace and security by emphasizing that, moving forward, the UN will prioritize prevention, peacebuilding, and political solutions. He further asserts that the UN will become "lean, agile, and field-focused" and that the peace and security pillar will "join forces with development, human rights and humanitarian action when and where it matters most." These are all worthy ambitions -- consistent with long-standing calls from member states and experts to strengthen cross-pillar coherence and revive the UN's political role in preventing and managing conflict. However, it's unclear how the recommendations that follow will help to achieve these lofty objectives. Most notably, while the report references a "substantial reorganization" of the Departments of Peace Operations (DPO) and Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), nowhere does it indicate what this might entail.
The recommendations are organized around three broad areas: shifting from silos to joined-up expertise, consolidating management and mission structures, and promoting networked multilateral approaches to peace operations.
Arguably the biggest change the report recommends is the dismantling of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI). Under this proposal, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and justice and corrections would move to a new Center of Excellence on Prevention, Peacebuilding and Peace Support (previously the Peacebuilding Support Office). OROLSI's other components would remain in DPO and report directly to the under-secretary-general for peace operations, as the OROLSI assistant secretary-general post would be abolished. This recommendation is sound, and it could facilitate more coherent support to member states from prevention through transition processes, as the report asserts.
The report also recommends establishing a centralized Center of Excellence on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) -- a reform initially recommended in 2017 but never implemented due to internal pushback. This, too, is a reasonable step toward providing unified Secretariat support to all mission settings, in partnership with UN Women and other relevant UN entities. It further recommends centralizing capacity on training, innovation, partnerships, and information integrity.
To consolidate mission and management structures, the report recommends combining the ASG post for the Americas, Europe, and Asia-Pacific with that for the Middle East, as well as combining the ASG positions for Western and Northern Africa. Because these positions were already joint across DPO and DPPA, the practical impact of this shift is limited to the elimination of two ASG positions. There are also a few recommendations to integrate or streamline offices in geographic areas where UN presences overlap -- for example, merging the UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement with the Office of the Special Adviser for Yemen, as well as the Office of the Special Adviser for Cyprus with the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP).
Finally, the report briefly touches on delegating certain civilian mandates of peace operations -- such as child protection, rule of law, and governance -- to other UN entities. In addition to slimming down mission mandates, this could reduce duplication, promote the comparative advantages of various UN entities, and support continuity before, during, and after mission transitions.
Where the Report Misses the Mark
While many of the report's recommendations make sense, they miss the mark in bringing about the type of reform the UN urgently needs. There are at least three significant shortfalls in the secretary-general's report.
First, and most importantly, the recommendations do not address the organization's most pressing challenges. In particular, they fail to mitigate the UN's acute liquidity crisis or larger existential questions facing the organization, including its loss of legitimacy and waning political influence.
Many of the reforms outlined in the secretary-general's Workstream 3 report come from the revised estimates he previously made to the 2026 budget. However, while these changes aim to reduce the overall budget, they do not address the underlying liquidity challenges, which stem in large part from member states not paying their dues in full and on time. In particular, the Trump administration's refusal to pay the US's dues has turned a persistent cash shortage into a full-scale crisis. Thus, while it is true that the UN will have less money to spend, the secretary-general's approach of cutting the budget does not fill the 22% gap left by the US. "Budget reductions cannot solve a cash shortfall caused by a member state refusing to pay its assessed contributions." All it does is lower the contributions of member states that are paying their dues by 20%, in effect making the liquidity crisis even worse.
Although improving efficiency and coordination in the field could enhance the effectiveness and reputation of the organization, focusing on administrative tweaks -- such as merging training capacities -- feels like tending to a patient's scraped knee while they're dying from cancer. What is desperately needed is a vision for resuscitating the UN's political role in peacemaking and mediation, including within the secretary-general's own office. However, thus far, he has avoided this challenge, preferring to punt hard questions to member states that themselves appear too weary and overburdened to respond.
Second, the report kicks the can down the road on one of the biggest peace and security debates: the future of UN peace operations. While it briefly references delegating certain civilian-led tasks to other UN entities, it articulates little else. Instead, it defers to the forthcoming review on the future of all forms of UN peace operations called for in the Pact for the Future, which the secretary-general states will provide a "comprehensive proposal" to "reset" UN peace operations for evolving conflict environments. This is an ambitious agenda for a process that has sputtered along due to infighting between DPO and DPPA. With the scope of the review still unclear and policymakers expressing low expectations, the likelihood of bold reform remains slim -- particularly given the secretary-general's well-known skepticism toward peacekeeping and the structural disincentives within the system for major change
Third, while the report claims to build on past reforms, it fails to address the structural issues that have undermined previous efforts, including the secretary-general's own 2017 reform agenda. Following the 2015 report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), the secretary-general proposed a series of reforms, including to the UN's peace and security pillar. Among the more ambitious proposals was the idea of bringing all field-based missions under a single Department of Peace Operations, in line with the HIPPO's recommendation of viewing all missions along a single spectrum. However, that proposal faced significant pushback from Secretariat personnel and some member states due to turf battles and resistance to funding all missions from a single peace operations support account. These and other recommendations aimed at bringing about a "substantial reorganization" of the departments will continue to fail unless the sources and structures of resistance are addressed.
Where Do We Go from Here?
In reality, policymakers' short-term options are limited. The secretary-general has opened a can of worms that he is incapable of managing -- both because he lacks strategic interest and leadership and because his term is quickly nearing its end. It will be up to the next secretary-general to breathe new life into the organization and take forward the mantel of a new vision. However, this could make the next 14 months feel like a long wait given the urgency of the moment. There are also many unknowns, including how the secretary-general selection process will play out, whether the US will pay its dues, and other global shifts that could expand or constrain the UN's room for action.
However, this doesn't mean that member states have to sit on their hands for the next year. The recently negotiated Pact for the Future provides many ingredients that can guide member states as they consider the reform recommendations and, critically, the selection of the next secretary-general. In the pact, member states made clear their desire to intensify the UN's role in preventive diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes, strengthen prevention and peacebuilding, and invest in more agile and context-responsive peace operations. These ambitions require continued investment in the system, both financially and politically, and the selection of a secretary-general who is capable of facilitating the art of diplomacy with the full support of member states.