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Thailand on the horns of a charter dilemma


Thailand on the horns of a charter dilemma

The Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) maintains total confidence in its push for amendments to Section 256 of the constitution, which would pave the way to establish a Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA).

Political scientists and red shirt leaders, however, are warning the party could be playing a political game -- supporting reform in public while signalling to its Senate allies to block it behind the scenes.

The debate over charter reform has once again taken centre stage. At the heart of the matter lies Section 256 of the charter, which governs how amendments can be made and whether a CDA may be formed.

Recently, the context shifted dramatically when Anutin Charnvirakul, leader of the Bhumjaithai Party (BJT), became prime minister under a coalition agreement with the opposition People's Party (PP).

A key condition for his premiership was a pledge to support fixing Section 256 to make rewriting a new charter possible. However, some experts were dubious whether the BJT will truly push the process forward or use it as a tool for political bargaining. They noted the risks of adopting such an ambiguous stance, and the uphill battle it may create to seeing the constitution amended.

The current constitution was drafted after the 2014 coup and has been criticised for further entrenching the military's influence. Reformists argue that its rules, particularly those concerning the Senate, weaken democratic accountability.

For years, opposition parties and civil society groups have tried to amend Section 256 to allow for a directly elected CDA, but their attempts were blocked.

A key condition that Mr Anutin agreed to secure the premiership is clear: deliver constitutional reform. But this condition conflicts with BJT's institutional interests.

It is widely accepted the party benefits from the current charter, which empowers the Senate -- many of whose members are considered close to Bhumjaithai and the conservative elite.

Also, Senate approval is indispensable as any constitutional amendment requires support from one-third of the Senate (67 votes out of 200) as well as a parliamentary majority.

The Constitutional Court ruled recently that while amendments can proceed, the public cannot directly elect a CDA. Instead, indirect models must be considered, complicating PP demands for a fully elected body. This leaves BJT caught between coalition commitments and institutional self-preservation.

The Senate's role cannot be overstated. Roughly 130-150 members of the upper chamber are viewed as aligned with BJT conservative forces, and have been dubbed the "blue line senators".

Given the constitutional requirement that 67 senators must vote in favour of any amendment, BJT holds a pivotal hand. Its influence over this bloc currently makes it the broker of constitutional change and raises suspicions that it may use this power to stall reform.

Already, blue-line senators have voiced scepticism, warning they will not support amendments unless a referendum is held first. It is a position which conveniently aligns with BJT's cautious stance and would stall the process of reform.

Both scholars and activists have warned over the BJT's potentially "two-faced strategy".

The party is publicly endorsing reform in line with coalition promises, projecting itself as cooperative and forward-looking, while quietly signalling to its Senate allies to block or delay the process to preserve the status quo and protect its political leverage.

Political scientist Phichai Ratnatilaka Na Bhuket, of the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), told the Bangkok Post that such suspicion cannot easily be dismissed.

He argues that although the government could theoretically push through reform within 3-4 months, an obstructive Senate -- quietly encouraged by the BJT -- could drag the process out for a year or more. This would allow BJT to satisfy coalition partners rhetorically while protecting its power base institutionally.

Nattawut Saikuar, veteran red-shirt leader and member of the Pheu Thai Party, said it is not enough for the three main opposition-friendly blocs -- PP, Pheu Thai and BJT (orange-red-blue) -- to simply agree in principle on charter reform.

The real battle is securing the crucial 67 Senate votes.

He urged PP to directly engage BJT, leveraging the latter's ties to the Senate, and extract explicit commitments rather than vague assurances.

For Mr Nattawut, the danger is clear: without explicit Senate backing, the reform agenda could collapse, betraying public expectations once again.

Despite these rumours, Siripong Angkasakulkiat, deputy leader of the BJT, projects confidence. He argues the party has always been open to amending Section 256 and stands ready to collaborate.

Mr Siripong suggests several models for establishing a drafting assembly, including selection by parliament from a vetted list of nominees and indirect election through intermediary representatives.

That would be similar to the CDA in 1997 that delivered the so-called "people's constitution", a landmark in terms of public participation in its drafting as well as the democratic nature of its articles.

While acknowledging the court's prohibition of direct elections, Mr Siripong frames these indirect models as pragmatic compromises.

Importantly, he maintains the timeline remains feasible: a first reading in October, followed by committee deliberations, with potential referendums aligned with the next general election.

He even predicted that a new charter could be rolled out within two years, ushering in a new era akin to the one prompted by the progressive and highly participatory 1997 charter.

Mr Siripong, however, insisted BJT cannot go along with a charter change that meddles with Section 112 of the Criminal Code, or lese majeste law.

"Should the proposal to amend Section 112 be presented in a fully liberalised form, BJT likely won't support it.

"Therefore, the critical issue is finding content that all sides can agree on. If the amendment is to moves forward, a workable compromise must be reached," he said.

The BJT deputy leader said the most important step is to begin the process; the details can be negotiated later. Based on the policy pledges from each party, there don't appear to be any major obstacles to this. "The real question is: how far-reaching will the proposed be?" he said.

Natthawut Buaprathum, a PP list-MP, has also highlighted the importance of unlocking Section 256 and says he remains optimistic that amendments can be achieved within four months, provided referendums are combined efficiently -- merging questions such as whether to amend and how to select the drafting body into a single vote.

But Mr Natthawut also recognises the hurdles: public scepticism that constitutional reform is merely a political elite project, legal constraints from the court's ruling, and the challenge of mobilising citizens in support of reform through public campaigning.

For him, the timeline is tight but achievable, if political will is genuine.

The court's latest ruling complicates matters further: amendments require three referendums although the first two may be combined. However, the process is bound to stretch timelines.

The ban on a directly elected CDA undermines reformists' central demand. At the same time, indirect election models risk repeating the flaws in the Senate's election process blamed for maintaing elite domination. The multi-level Senate polls, made enormously complex by inter and intra-profession votes, last year were fraught with alleged vote fixing.

The Constitutional Court's ruling provides BJT and its Senate allies with ample legal justifications to delay or dilute reform, while still claiming to be following constitutional procedures.

Mr Natthawu noted the court ruling on the referendums contains elements that could influence the direction of change. He said the full ruling has yet to be released, but once available, it should provide greater clarity on the legal framework and procedural implications.

He acknowledged differing views among parties, particularly regarding the composition of the drafting body.

He estimated the referendum process would take no less than 60 days and no more than 150 days from the date of proposal, leaving open a possibility the referendum could coincide with the next general election.

However, forming a new drafting body could take 6-9 months, which may not sit with the urgency of reformist goals.

"The current parliament may not be able to complete the constitution in time, but we can unlock the process and pass it on to the next government," he said.

Mr Natthawut identified hurdles including disagreements over whether the pillar Chapters 1 and 2, which affirm Thailand's indivisibility and constitutional monarchy, should be subject to amendment.

He argued that while these principles are foundational, some updates may be necessary to reflect modern realities.

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